By Jacob Marshak (auth.)

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Additional resources for Economic Information, Decision, and Prediction: Selected Essays: Volume II

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If a group is a foundation but not a team, the group has a goal separate from the individual goals. This gives rise to the problem of individual incentives that would best serve the group goal. If a group is a coalition but not a foundation, there is no 'group interest' to help in making all choices: when any state is reached where no member can be made better off without making another member worse off, further choices are determined by bargaining, and problems of 'relative power' arise. If a group of rational men is not a coalition, there arises the general problem of a (generally non-constantsum) game.

Sm); p~, ... , p~)~U(Sl' ... , 36 INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION m m 1 1 L p;U(8,) ~ L p;U(8,). In other words: if we regard U(81), ... , on its expectation (mean). In this sense, the rational man is defined as maximizing expected utility. 6 where we ask for the rules of action and communication that would maximize the team's expected net gain. This definition of rational decision under uncertainty goes back to Daniel Bernoulli and has been recently much discussed, under the impact of certain behavior postulates formulated in the Theory of Games.

However, the concept of rationality which we shall use is stronger than the one just stated. The rational decision-maker is defined as being able to represent his preferences by a numerical utility function possessing the following property. Denote by (Sl' ... , sm; P1' ... , Pm) a prospect consisting of the anticipation of prospects (possibly, sure outcomes) Sl' ... , Sm with respective probabilities P1' ... , Pm. Then U(Sl' ... , sm); p~, ... , p~)~U(Sl' ... , 36 INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION m m 1 1 L p;U(8,) ~ L p;U(8,).

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